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ARBITRATION-THE THIRD CIRCUIT RE-EXAMINES ITs TRADITIONAL
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION OF ERISA CLAIMS.
Pritzker v.'Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
As a private means of resolving disputes, arbitration is an inexpensive
and efficient alternative to traditional judicial proceedings.' Although ar-
bitration has been widely used in the collective bargaining context,2 its use
for adjudicating federal statutory claims has been the subject of extensive
debate. 3
1. See generally MARTIN DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION (G. Wilner ed., 1984) (discussing commercial arbitration); GEORGE
GOLDBERG, A LAWYER's GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983) (same);
THOMAs H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1987) (same); DIANE T. OLSSON,
BASIC DocuMENTs ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1984) (same).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1988) (Labor Relations Management Act). The Labor
Relations Management Act, the current law regarding unions and collective bar-
gaining, sets forth its position on alternative methods of dispute resolution in its
declaration of purpose and policy:
It is the policy of the United States that ... the settlement of issues be-
tween employers and employees through collective bargaining may be
advanced by making available full and adequate governmental facilities
for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and en-
courage employers and the representatives of their employees to reach
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working
conditions, and to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differences
by mutual agreement reached through conferences and collective bar-
gaining or by such methods as may be provided for in any applicable
agreement for the settlement of disputes.
Id.
3. See Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The
Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 303 (1987) (stating that most signifi-
cant concern with arbitration is importance of "preserving the role of institutions
that have been entrusted with the task of promulgating and interpreting behav-
ioral norms and are ultimately responsible to the public for the manner in which
they discharge those tasks"); Edward M. Morgan, Contract Themy and the Sources of
Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1059, 1077 (1987)
(stating that some, but not all, suits arising under federal statutory claims are suita-
ble for arbitration). But see Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1987) (discussing recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence favoring arbitration of federal statutory claims). See generally
Robert C. Castle & Paul Lansing, Arbitration of Labor Grievances Brought Under Con-
tractual and Statutoy Ptuvisions: The Supreme Court Grows Less Deferential to the Arbitra-
tion Process, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 49 (1983) (analyzing Supreme Court's waning
deference to findings and awards of labor arbitrators).
(957)
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The Federal Arbitration Act 4 (Act or Arbitration Act) authorizes arbi-
tration of claims arising out of contracts affecting interstate commerce.5
The purpose of the Act, as indicated in its legislative history, is to avoid the
delay and expense of litigation.6 Despite congressional authorization to
arbitrate under the Act, courts precluded federal statutory claims from ar-
bitration due to the Supreme Court's concern that arbitral forums were
not suited to handle complex statutory disputes affecting substantive
rights. 7 One such area where substantial litigation has occurred 8
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. Id. Section 2 explains the validity, irrevocability and enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate, stating that
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a con-
tract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
Id. § 2.
6. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). The House Report states that "[t]he bill declares simply
that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure
in the Federal courts for their enforcement. The procedure is very simple....
reducing technicality, delay, and expense to a minimum and at the same time
safeguarding the rights of the parties." H.R. REP. No. 96. Likewise, the Senate
report states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he desire to avoid the delay and expense of
litigation persists. The desire grows with time and as delays and expenses increase.
[sic] The settlement of disputes by arbitration appeals to big business and little
business alike, to corporate interests as well as to individuals." S. REP. No. 536.
7. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding that claims arising
under § 12(2) of Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988), are not subject
to compulsory arbitration). The Supreme Court's distrust of arbitration, as articu-
lated in Wilko, constituted the law regarding arbitration of federal statutory claims
until 1987. The Court stated:
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of
an alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but
applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their
award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a
complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the
legal meaning of such statutory requirements as "burden of proof," "rea-
sonable care" or "material fact," . . . cannot be examined. Power to va-
cate an award is limited .... In unrestricted submissions, such as the
present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation. The United States
Arbitration Act contains no provision for judicial determination of legal
issues such as is found in the English law.
Id. at 435-37 (citations omitted).
8. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d
1110, 1122 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding statutory violations of ERISA subject to agree-
ments to arbitrate); Graphic Communications Union v. GCIU, 917 F.2d 1184, 1188
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding arbitration clause valid where claim involves interpreta-
tion of plan, and not ERISA claim per se); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express,
958 [Vol. 39: p. 957
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is the arbitrability of claims arising from statutory violations of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 9 Congress enacted
ERISA, the federal law governing employee benefit plans,10 to assure
Inc., 871 F.2d 292, 298 (2d Cir.) (holding arbitration clause in ERISA-covered pen-
sion plan invalid), vacated, 493 U.S. 884 (1989), appeal after remand, 926 F.2d 116,
121-22 (2d Cir.) (reversing its decision in light of subsequent Supreme Court juris-
prudence favoring arbitration), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991); Amulfo P. Sulit,
Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
validity of agreements to arbitrate pension disputes); Barrowclough v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939-40 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that construction of
plan claims are arbitrable, but statutory claims need not be arbitrated), overruled by
Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993);
Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
claimant is not required to exhaust arbitration procedures prior to bringing action
under § 510 of ERISA); Witkowski v. Welch, No. CIVA.92-0924, 1993 WL 69587, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1993) (holding statutory ERISA claims and contractual claims
involving ERISA plan are subject to agreements to arbitrate); Holloway v. Gruntal
& Co., Inc., No. 89-8421, 1993 WL 36170, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1993) (holding
ERISA provides no bar to mandatory arbitration clauses); Fabian Fin. Servs. v. Kurt
H. Volk, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 768 F. Supp. 728, 733-34 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (find-
ing nothing in text or legislative history precludes waiver of judicial remedies);
Lindahl v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 609 F. Supp. 267, 272 (N.D. Il. 1985) (stating
that other courts have concluded that arbitration is not required for claim alleging
that plan language violated ERISA); Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 526 F. Supp.
299, 321 (D.NJ. 1980) (acknowledging controversy over arbitration of ERISA
claims, but not reaching issue), rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1982), appeal
after remand, 755 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 277-78 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding arbitration not re-
quired for claim under stockholder's employment agreement).
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). ERISA is comprised of three subchapters.
The first subchapter, entitled "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights," is the main
focus of this Casebrief. Id. §§ 1001-1169. Of this subchapter, §§ 1001-1003 are
comprised of findings, definitions and coverage provisions. Sections 1021-1145
consist of substantive regulations and limitations of coverage. Specifically, §§ 1021-
1031 concern reporting and disclosure; §§ 1051-1061 govern participation and
vesting; §§ 1081-1086 deal with funding; §§ 1101-1114 concern the role of fiducia-
ries; and §§ 1131-1145 apply to administration and enforcement. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1145.
For an overview of ERISA decisions in the circuit courts, see infra note 72.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145. Congressional enactment of ERISA officially pre-
empted state law concerning the regulation of employee benefit plans. Id.
§ 1144(a). Congressional intent to preempt state legislation in this area is made
explicit in § 514 of ERISA. Section 514 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in 1001-
1169. Of this subchapter, §§ 1001-1003 are comprised of findings, defini-
tions and coverage provisions. Sections 1021-1145 consist of substantive
regulations and limitations of coverage. Specifically, §§ 1021-1031 con-
cern reporting and disclosure; §§ 1051-1061 govern participation and
vesting; §§ 1081-1086 deal with funding; §§ 1101-1114 concern the role of
fiduciaries; and §§ 1131-1145 apply to administration and enforcement.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145.
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that the financial interests of employee pensions are adequately safe-
guarded.11
The rules governing ERISA are quite complex. 12 In fact, the complex
nature of the statute has led to much debate as to whether statutory ERISA
claims are suitable for arbitration or whether such disputes require a judi-
cial forum.' 3 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.14 had previously
held that statutory violations of ERISA were not subject to arbitration. 15
The Supreme Court, however, recently held in favor of arbitration for
some violations of other federal statutes. 16 In light of these decisions, the
For an overview of ERISA decisions in the circuit courts, see infra note 72,§ 1003(a) of this tide and not exempt under § 1003(b) of this tide. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
11. See 119 CONG. REc. S130 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1973) (statement of Senator
Williams), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsToRY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECUR-
rrv ACT OF 1974, at 90 (1976) (explaining congressional concern that financial
interests of plan participants were not adequately safeguarded without some level
of protective legislation). Because Congress recognized the importance of pen-
sion income to those of retirement age, Congress established minimum standards
"assuring the equitable character of [benefits] plans and their financial sound-
ness." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). These standards consist of reporting and disclosure
requirements, as well as minimum standards for participation, vesting, funding
and the fiduciary duties of plan administrators. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461; see also
Jennifer L. Bragg, ERISA ARBITRATION-Participant in Unfunded Deferred Compen-
sation Plan Required to Submit Claim to Enforce Terms of Plan to Arbitration, 31 VILL. L.
REv. 1166, 1166-67 nn.1-7 (1986) (discussing purpose and legislative history of
ERISA).
12. For a list of commentators who provide discussion explaining the com-
plexities of ERISA, see infra note 25.
13. For a listing of notable cases regarding arbitrability of ERISA claims, see
supra note 8.
14. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985), overruled 6y Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of Barrow-
dough, see infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
15. Barrowcough, 752 F.2d at 939-40.
16. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)
(holding that claims arising under Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) may be subject to arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989) (holding arbitration valid for violations
under Securities and Exchange Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (holding claims arising under anti-fraud provi-
sions of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act subject to arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (determining agreement to arbi-
trate before Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association encompassed antitrust
counterclaim); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (hold-
ing that when one party files motion to compel, district courts required to compel
arbitration of pendent claims, even if "result would be possibly inefficient mainte-
nance of separate proceedings in different forums"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 509, 519-20 (1974) (holding claims under § 10(b) of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 subject to arbitration if arising in international business trans-
action). For a discussion of some of these recent Supreme Court developments,
see infra notes 23-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39: p. 957
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Third Circuit re-evaluated the Barrowdough decision in Pritzker v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.17 and now holds that statutory ERISA
claims are subject to arbitration under the Act.18
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit's approach to arbitration,
analyzes the Pritzker decision, and considers the future ramifications in the
Third Circuit for arbitration of statutory violations of ERISA. Part II dis-
cusses the evolving view of the United States Supreme Court concerning
arbitration of federal statutory claims. 19 Part III initially considers the
Third Circuit's general approach to arbitration and then turns to its spe-
cific approach to arbitration of statutory ERISA claims.20 Part III also re-
views the effect that some recent Supreme Court decisions have had in
shaping the Third Circuit's view of arbitration.2 1 Finally, Part IV focuses
on the impact the Prtr&ker decision will have on those seeking remedies in
the Third Circuit for ERISA violations.2 2
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLVING VIEW OF ARBITRATION
While some circuits have considered the issue, the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on whether ERISA claims are subject to arbitration.2 3 The
Court has, however, made rulings on the validity of arbitration for disputes
arising under other federal statutes. Specifically, the Court has focused on
securities and employment discrimination claims.2 4 These decisions are
particularly useful in predicting how the Supreme Court will evaluate ER-
ISA arbitration claims because ERISA involves both employee rights and
certain aspects of securities law arising out of pension fund agreements.2 5
17. 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
18. Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1121-22; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(Federal Arbitration Act). For a detailed discussion of Pritzker, see infra notes 100-
42 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's evolving view, see infra notes 23-
71 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to arbitration generally
and, specifically, its approach to arbitration of statutory ERISA claims, see infra
notes 72-99 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the effect of some recent Supreme Court decisions on
the Third Circuit's view of arbitration, see infra notes 100-21 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of the impact Pritzker will have on those seeking remedies
in the Third Circuit for ERISA violations, see infra notes 122-42 and accompanying
text.
23. See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110,
1116-21 (3d. Cir. 1993) (applying Supreme Court decisions that upheld arbitration
of other federal statutory claims because no Supreme Court case yet has addressed
whether ERISA claims are subject to arbitration). For a discussion of analogous
Supreme Court cases concerning arbitration, see infra notes 27-71 and accompany-
ing text.
24. For a discussion of these rulings, see infra notes 27-71 and accompanying
text.
25. See generaUy MICHAELJ. CANAN & WILLIAM D. MrrCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE
AND WELFARE BENEFrr PLANS (1991) (discussing regulation of employee benefit
1994]
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While at one time the Court disfavored arbitration, these cases reflect the
Court's recent approval of arbitration as an effective and efficient means
of dispute resolution. 26
The Supreme Court first considered the validity of arbitration of fed-
eral claims in Wilko v. Swan.2 7 In Wilko, a customer brought an action
against a securities brokerage firm to recover damages under the anti-
fraud provision of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).2 8 Several agree-
ments between the parties contained stipulations to arbitrate all future dis-
putes2 9 The Wilko Court considered the validity of these arbitration
agreements in light of language in the 1933 Act that appeared to require a
judicial forum.30 Because the language of the statute explicitly mentioned
ajudicial forum, the Court found that the arbitration clauses contravened
the clear intent of the statute and were, therefore, unenforceable31
plans); JAMES 0. CASTAGNERA & DAVID A. Lr-rlLL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS (1992) (same); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK (Jeffrey D. Mamor-
sky, ed., 3d ed. 1992) (same); HENRY H. PE~rRr, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS:
LAW AND PRACIcE (1990) (discussing labor and pension trust aspects of ERISA);
Simone, Understanding ERISA-An Introduction to Basic Employee Benefits 1992, 327
PRAc. L. INST. (1992) (discussing regulation of employee benefit plans).
26. For a discussion of the prevailing Supreme Court view of arbitration in
the McMahon and Rodriguez decisions, see infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
27. 346 U.S 427 (1953).
28. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428. The anti-fraud provision contained in § 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988) (1933 Act), provides that any
person
sell[ing] a security.., which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments not misleading ... shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him ... to recover the consideration paid for such security
with the interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
29. Wilko, 346 U.S at 429-30. At the trial level, the respondent moved to stay
the proceedings pursuant to § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act in order to compel
arbitration as stated in the margin agreements. Id. at 429. The district court de-
nied the motion, holding that such an agreement to arbitrate denied petitioner of
the judicial forum protections provided in the 1933 Act. Id. at 430 (citing Wilko v.
Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 79 (1952)). A divided court of appeals determined that the
1933 Act did not prohibit arbitration and reversed. Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 201
F.2d 439, 445 (1953)).
30. Id. at 430-35. Construed together, the language of § 14 and § 22 of the
1933 Act appears to require a judicial forum. Section 14 provides that "[a] ny con-
dition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of
the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988). Section 22 of the Act
provides that "[t]he district courts of the United States... shall have jurisdiction
... concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (1988). Given this language, the Court required a judicial forum. Wilko,
346 U.S. at 430.
31. Id. at 434-35.
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The Wilko Court stated that the right to select ajudicial forum was the
type of provision that could not be "waived."3 2 The Court viewed arbitra-
tion as an inadequate means for resolving statutory disputes.3 3 The major-
ity presumed that arbitral tribunals could not handle complex statutory
matters and that the streamlined procedures of arbitration negatively af-
fected the plaintiff's substantive rights. 34 Furthermore, the Wilko Court
feared that the arbitrators would not follow judicial precedent because the
Arbitration Act did not require the arbitrators to give reasons to support
their findings.3 5 In the wake of the Wilko decision, arbitration agreements
were generally disfavored as a means of dispute resolution for statutory
claims.36
Soon after deciding Wilko, the Court modified its decision when it
decided Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.3 7 In McMahon, the
Court addressed whether claims arising under the anti-fraud provisions in
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)38 and the
32. Id. at 435. The Court reasoned that Congress intended buyers of securi-
ties under the Act to be placed on a different footing than other purchasers that
may be subject to arbitration:
When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the [1933] Act, waives
his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in
other business transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of
courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives
him and surrenders it at a time when he is less able to judge the weight of
the handicap the [1933] Act places upon his adversary.
Id.
33. Id. at 435-37.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 436.
36. See, e.g., De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding member of Pacific Stock Exchange cannot be compelled to arbi-
trate federal securities claims); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding arbitration clauses void
where federal securities laws were concerned); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833-35 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that absent
presence of international concerns, arbitration agreement void and unenforceable
with respect to claim arising under Rule 10b-5 of Securities Exchange Commis-
sion); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-38 (2d Cir.) (holding bankruptcy
trustee could not be compelled to arbitrate claims under securities laws and Bank-
ruptcy Act), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540,
543 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that federal securities law claims are not arbitrable),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
37. 482 U.S. 220, 230-34 (1987). Because Wilko arose under the 1933 Act, and
not the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), Wilko was not expressly over-
ruled. Id. at 235-38. However, the holding in McMahon "substantially eroded"
Wilo, making it of dubious precedential value. See G. Richard Shell, ERSA and
Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substi-
tute"for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L. REv. 509, 530-31 (1990) (explaining how Wilko was
implicitly overruled by McMahon).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
7
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)3 9 were sub-
ject to arbitration. 4° The McMahon Court distinguished Wiko, stating that
Wilko did not hold that arbitration was inadequate in all circumstances. 4 1
Rather, the McMahon Court read Wilko to hold that waiver of a judicial
forum is barred only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the sub-
stantive rights in question.42
In McMahon, the Court held that Congress did not intend the 1934
Act to require a judicial forum for resolution of securities law claims.43
Although the underlying policies of the 1934 Act were substantially similar
to those of the 1933 Act articulated in the Wilko case, the McMahon Court
did not find the reasoning of Wilko dispositive. 44 Thus, although the two
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c) (1988). The Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is primarily a criminal statute that provides for
civil remedies for unlawful activity. Section 1962 states, in pertinent part:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. § 1962(c). Section 1964(c) authorizes treble damages for those injuries to busi-
ness or property as a. result of unlawful activity under the statute. Section 1964(c)
provides: "(c) Any person injured to his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. § 1964(c). The McMa-
hon Court concluded that neither the "district court" provision of § 1964, nor any-
thing in the legislative history of the statute precluded arbitration of RICO claims.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238. Further, the Court determined that no conflict existed
between arbitration and RICO's underlying purpose. Id. at 239. Therefore, arbi-
tration could exist as an acceptable means of dispute resolution for RICO claims.
Id. at 242.
40. McMahon, 492 U.S. at 242.
41. Id. at 228-29.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 227. The Court rejected the argument that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration in § 29(a) of the 1934 Act, which declares void "[a]ny condi-
tion, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of [the Act]." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988)). Plaintiff McMa-
hon argued that the provision compelling arbitration waived compliance of § 27 of
the 1934 Act. Id. Section 27 provides, in pertinent part:
"The district courts of the United States... shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder,
and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)).
44. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
964 [Vol. 39: p. 957
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statutory provisions applied in each case were nearly identical, the
Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions, 45 thereby signaling a shift
towards arbitration.
Incidentally, the McMahon decision marked a change in the Court's
view of arbitration. Specifically, the McMahon Court recognized the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act's policy favoring arbitration 46 and held that this policy
should not be diminished merely because a party to an agreement raised a
claim based on statutory rights. 47 Moreover, the McMahon Court stressed
that although the Federal Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by
congressional demand, the burden is on the party against arbitration to
prove that Congress precluded a waiver of ajudicial forum for the particu-
lar statutory rights in question.48
In 1989, two years after the decision in McMahon, the Supreme Court
finally overruled Wiko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express
Inc.49 Rodriguez addressed the same issue confronted in Wilko: whether
claims arising under the 1933 Act were subject to arbitration. However,
the Rodriguez Court concluded that the reasons articulated in WiLko in
favor of prohibiting arbitration were no longer sound.50 Although the
Wilko Court had justified its interpretation of the 1933 Act based on an
"old judicial hostility to arbitration," 51 the Rodrigue Court no longer could
justify the competing rationales of Wilko and McMahon merely because
they were based on two slightly different securities laws.52 Thus, the
Supreme Court now stands in favor of arbitration-at least in the area of
securities law.53
45. Id. at 238.
46. Id. at 226.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
50. Id. at 482. Particularly, the Rodriguez Court rejected the Wilko Court's rea-
soning that § 14 of the 1933 Act nullified arbitration agreements because such an
agreement "waive[s] compliance with any provision" of the Securities Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77n (1988); Rodriquez, 490 U.S. at 480.
51. Rodriquez, 490 U.S. at 480 (quoting Judge Jerome Frank in Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
52. Id. at 477.
53. Id. at 486. The Court noted:
To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of
weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong en-
dorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes.
Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceed-
ings is set to one side, it becomes clear that the right to select the judicial
forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential features of




Bouchard: Arbitration - The Third Circuit Re-Examines Its Traditional Appro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
ViLLANOVA LAW REVIEW
While commentators have interpreted both McMahon and Rodriguez to
favor arbitration for a broad array of statutory claims,5 4 the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to allow arbitration for all statutory claims. 55 For
example, the Supreme Court has held that claims arising under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196456 and § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
187157 are not subject to arbitration agreements. 8 However, the
54. See Rita M. Cain, Preemption of State Arbitration Statutes: The Exaggerated Fed-
eral Policy Favoring Arbitration, 19J. CONTEMP. L. 1 (1993) (discussing impact McMa-
hon and Rodriguez have had on enforceability of arbitration provisions-
specifically, Federal Arbitration Act's preemption of state law prohibiting arbitra-
tion in consumer contracts); Robert A. Lusardi, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
in Securities Fraud Disputes, 41 RUTGERS L. Rv. 541 (1989) (proposing changes in
arbitration process to better allow for arbitration of securities disputes); Frank E.
Massengale & Marie Breaux Stroud, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Federal Securities Law,
36 Loy. L. REv. 821 (1990) (suggesting that lack of Fifth Circuit opinions regard-
ing securities claims after 1989 is due to fact that McMahon and Rodriguez compel
arbitration upon proof of binding arbitration agreement); G. Richard Shell, The
Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 Am. Bus. LJ. 397 (1988) (stating that McMahon deci-
sion expansively interpreted Federal Arbitration Act "to cover many types of com-
mercial claims formerly thought to be exclusively within purview of judiciary");
Leslie M. Gillin, Note, A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protec-
tion for Aged Employees ?, 35 VILL. L. Rxv. 389 (1990) (proposing that rights of ADEA
claimants should be arbitrable under Federal Arbitration Act); Laura R. Hillock,
Comment, Arbitration of Title VII and Parallel State Discrimination Claims: A Proposa
27 CAL. W. L. REv. 179 (1991) (recommending that Title VII claims should be
subject to arbitration in light of McMahon and Rodriguez).
55. For a discussion of cases not allowing arbitration for statutory claims, see
infra note 59.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. SeeJOEL
W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 32 (1983) (outlining law of employment discrimina-
tion); Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 906 (1978) (same).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
58. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding § 1983
claim not subject to arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974) (holding Title VII claim not subject to arbitration). In Alexander, the
Supreme Court held that an African-American employee could challenge his ter-
mination under a Title VII claim in federal court, even though an arbitrator under
the collective bargaining agreement upheld his termination "for cause." Alexander,
415 U.S. at 42-43. The Alexander Court, while affirming arbitration as the method
to resolve labor disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement, re-
jected arbitration as a method to resolve Title VII disputes. Id. at 55-56. The
Court's decision was based primarily on three conflicts of interest that labor arbi-
trators would experience in Title VII claims. Id. First, the labor arbitrator must
"effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legis-
966 [Vol. 39: p. 957
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Supreme Court has cast doubt on these holdings by remanding circuit
court cases in these areas.5 9 The Supreme Court currently appears to
favor arbitration of employment discrimination claims, as evidenced by its
recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.60 In Gilmer, the
Court held that some claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) 6 1 are subject to arbitration. 62 Gilmer's employer,
Interstate, required Gilmer to sign a registration agreement with the New
York Stock Exchange which provided for arbitration of any employment
dispute. 63 After working with the company for seven years, Gilmer, then
lation." Id. at 56-57. Second, if federal statutory law conflicts with the collective
bargaining agreement, labor arbitrators are required to follow the language of the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 57. Third, because the union representing
the employee has an interest in preserving a working relationship with the em-
ployer, such an interest conflicts with the goal of full representation of the em-
ployee. Id. Although Title VII claims are not subject to arbitration, the Alexander
Court noted that lower courts could use their discretion to admit arbitral findings
"as evidence" in a Title VII judicial proceeding. Id. at 60.
In McDonald, the Court reaffirmed the rationale set forth in Alexander. McDon-
ald, 466 U.S. at 284. The McDonald Court held that labor arbitration "cannot pro-
vide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal
statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard." Id. at 290.
McDonald distinguished between contractual claims arising from collective bargain-
ing arrangements which are subject to arbitration, and statutory claims such as
Title VII and § 1983 which are reserved to the courts. Id.; see also Shell, supra note
37, at 526 (discussing implications of McDonald decision).
Although these cases represent the present state of the law concerning the
arbitrability of Title VII and § 1983 claims, both cases did not arise under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. For a discussion of the resulting limited interpretation of
Alexander, see infra note 66.
59. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930, 930 (1991) (vacat-
ing and remanding Fifth Circuit decision finding Title VII claims exempt from
arbitration agreements). On remand, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its former
position and concluded that Title VII claims were subject to arbitration. Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of Bird
v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989), a Second
Circuit ERISA decision similarly vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court af-
ter precluding arbitration of the statutory claim involved therein, see infra note 72.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer favoring arbitration for
ADEA claims, see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
60. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). The ADEA prohibits employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of age. SeeJOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DIscIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT LAw 7 (1986) (outlining law of employment discrimination); Note, The Class
Action Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Current Status, Controver-
sies, and Suggested Clarifications, 32 HAMNos L.J. 1377, 1379 (1981) (same).
62. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
63. Id. at 23. The registration agreement provided for arbitration of "[a] ny
controversy.., arising out of the employment or termination of employment of
such registered representative." Id. Such an agreement appears to be in direct
conflict with § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which prohibits arbitration of dis-
putes arising out of employment contracts. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). For the pertinent
text of the statute, see infra note 116. The Court addressed this potential conflict
in footnote two of its opinion. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. The Court reasoned that
§ 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act was inapplicable because the arbitration clause
1994] 967
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sixty-two years old, was fired by Interstate. 64 As a result of his dismissal,
Gilmer filed suit alleging age discrimination, and Interstate moved to com-
pel arbitration based on the registration agreement signed by Gilmer.65
In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that parties are permitted to
agree to arbitrate ADEA claims. 66 In making its determination, the Court
held that arbitration did not conflict with the fundamental social policies
the ADEA outlined because arbitrators would be knowledgeable of the law
and enforce the provisions of the statute.6 7 Therefore, because the
Supreme Court trusted the statutory knowledge of the arbitrators, the re-
quirement to adjudicate violations of statutory rights in a judicial forum
was largely eviscerated.
Although the Gilmer decision gives a strong indication of the Supreme
Court's view of arbitration under the ADEA, the validity of arbitration for
other employment claims is not yet clear.68 ERISA is unique because it
addresses both securities issues and employment law issues.6 9 While the
in question was not contained in a contract for employment. Id. Rather, Gilmer's
arbitration clause was contained in a contract with the securities exchange, not
with his employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation. Id. Therefore, the
Court stated that it would "leave for another day" whether a claim arising in an
employment contract would violate § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.
64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
65. Id. at 24. The district court denied the employer's motion to compel arbi-
tration, basing its decision on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36(1974). Id. For a discussion of Alexander, see supra note 58. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed, stating that there is "nothing in the text, legislative history, or
underlying purposes of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990)).
66. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. In making its determination, the Gilmer Court re-jected the argument that the EEOC's enforcement role would be diminished with
arbitration. Id. at 28. The Court also distinguished the Alexander case which re-jected arbitration for a Title VII claim. Id. at 33-34. The Court reasoned that
Alexander addressed whether arbitration of a contractually-based claim precluded
subsequent judicial determination of statutory claims. Id. Because the Alexander
decision arose in a collective-bargaining context, and was not decided under the
Federal Arbitration Act, the Court did not find the case controlling. Id.
67. Id. at 29. In rejecting the argument that arbitration would be inconsistent
with the social policies of the ADEA, the Court analogized it to claims arising
under other statutes which have been subject to arbitration. Id. The Court stated:
The Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the
Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance important public poli-
cies, but, as noted above, claims under these statutes are appropriate for
arbitration. "[Sbo long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindi-
cate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the stat-
ute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."
Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
68. For a discussion of the differing positions the Supreme Court has taken
on the arbitrability of employment claims, see supra notes 59-67 and accompany-
ing text.
69. For citations that provide a general overview of ERISA, see supra note 25.
968 [Vol. 39: p. 957
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arbitrability of securities claims has been recognized, 70 the issues concern-
ing the arbitration of employment-related claims have not been conclu-
sively settled by the Supreme Court.7 1 Therefore, the issue of whether
arbitration is permitted under ERISA has been left for the federal circuit
courts to decide.
Il. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO ARBITRATION
After McMahon and Rodriguez, various circuit courts of appeals have
addressed ERISA litigation, with the majority of the circuits holding that
ERISA claims are proper subjects of arbitration. 72 Historically, the Third
70. For a discussion of the arbitrability of securities claims, see supra notes 38-
53 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of the arbitrability of employment-related claims, see
supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir.
1988) (upholding validity of agreements to arbitrate pension disputes); Bird v.
Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), vacated, 493 U.S. 884
(1989), appeal after remand, 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891
(1991) (reversing, in light of Rodrigue; court's earlier holding that arbitration
clause in ERISA-covered pension plan was invalid).
In Sulit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined
both the legislative history of ERISA and the Supreme Court's decision in McMa-
hon to hold that agreements to arbitrate pension funds were valid. 847 F.2d 475,
477-79 (8th Cir. 1988). Sulit, Inc. engaged Dean Witter to maintain the Sulit, Inc.
pension plan, agreeing to mandatory arbitration over any dispute arising out of the
pension fund agreement. Id. at 476. In its reasoning, the Sulit court viewed claims
regarding pension funds under ERISA as substantially similar to anti-trust claims,
which were subject to arbitration in McMahon. Id. at 477. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit enforced the validity of arbitration agreements for ERISA-based claims. Id.
The Second Circuit's decision in Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.
is particularly helpful in understanding how the Supreme Court would decide the
issue of ERISA-based arbitration, if the issue were to come before the Court. 871
F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit in Bird held that an arbitration clause
under an ERISA-covered plan conflicted with the language in ERISA that provided
for "ready access to the federal courts." Bird, 871 F.2d at 296. The Second Circuit
construed that phrase to mean that "Congress envisioned the federal courts as the
central forum for enforcement of ERISA." Id. at 297. Because of this language,
the Second Circuit concluded that Congress intended ERISA to be exempted from
the Federal Arbitration Act and any agreements to arbitrate. Id. at 295-97.
The Supreme Court, however, after examining the Second Circuit's decision
in Bird, remanded the case for the Second Circuit to reconsider its ruling in light
of the Rodrigue decision. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 493 U.S.
884 (1989). On remand, the Second Circuit held that the ERISA mandate of
"ready access to federal courts" did not inherently conflict with the mandatory
arbitration clause in question. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926
F.2d 116, 120-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991). The Second Circuit
interpreted Rodriguez to mean that arbitration agreements should be enforced ab-
sent proof that: (1) the statute explicitly prohibited arbitration; or (2) the purpose
of the statute conflicted with an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 119. Thus, although
the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of ERISA-based arbitration, it has
indicated how it would decide a case with facts similar to Bird. See Joseph R. Si-
mone, ERTSA and Arbitration: Where Are We?, in 820 SECURrrIES'ARBITRATION 1993:
PRODUCTS, PROCEDURES, AND CAUSES OF ACTION 171 (Practicing Law Institute, July-
Aug. 1993) (providing general discussion of Bird and its implications).
1994] 969
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Circuit has not favored arbitration for resolution of federal statutory
claims. 73
For example, prior to McMahon and Rodriguez, the Third Circuit held
in Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.74 that claims arising
out of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act were not subject to arbitra-
tion.75 The issue proposed in Jacobson was whether arbitration provisions
in brokerage transaction agreements are enforceable under the Arbitra-
tion Act.76 The Jacobson court relied on both the Supreme Court decision
in Wilko and Third Circuit precedent 77 to find that arbitration was im-
proper.78 Although the Supreme Court in McMahon overruled the Jacob-
son decision when it subjected claims arising out of the 1934 Act to
arbitration, 79 the opinion in Jacobson illustrates the Third Circuit's reluc-
tance to recognize arbitration agreements. 80 In fact, the language used in
the Jacobson opinion suggests that the Third Circuit would not change its
opinion of arbitration unless specifically mandated by the Supreme
Court.8 1
Before the Supreme Court decisions in McMahon and Rodriguez, the
Third Circuit first addressed whether statutory ERISA claims were subject
to arbitration in Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.8 2 In Barrowclough,
For a discussion of one particular view of arbitration before McMahon and
Rodrigue2, see Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984). In
Amaro v. Continental Can Co., the Ninth Circuit held that a claimant is not required
to exhaust arbitration procedures for contractual grievances for statutory viola-
tions of ERISA. Id. at 752. In Amaro, employees alleged that company officials laid
off personnel in order to prevent them from obtaining the requisite years of ser-
vice to qualify for the pension plan. Id. at 748. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in
enacting ERISA, Congress created statutory rights independent of any collectively
bargained rights. Id. at 749. The Amaro court held that because ERISA provided
claimants with "ready access to federal courts," such a right could not be fore-
closed by a contractual arbitration agreement. Id. at 750.
73. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's historical approach to arbitration,
see infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
74. 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987).
75. Id. at 1203.
76. Id. at 1199.
77. SeeAyres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 539
(3d Cir.) (holding claims against brokerage firm for violations of anti-fraud provi-
sions of the 1934 Act were not arbitrable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
78. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1201-02.
79. For a discussion of McMahon, see supra notes 38-48 and accompanying
text.
80. SeeJacobson, 797 F.2d at 1201 (rejecting argument that recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence was signaling shift away from authority of Ayres in Third
Circuit).
81. Id. The Jacobson court stated: "The Ayres opinion [which applied the Wilko
rule to claims under the 1934 Act] ... binds this panel unless we can conclude that
it has been overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases." Id. (citations omitted)
(footnote omitted).
82. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985), overrukd 6y Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
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the Third Circuit expressed its disfavor of arbitration by holding that
claims arising under ERISA were not subject to arbitration.83 Barrow-
clough, a former employee of the defendant, brought suit to enforce the
terms of an unfunded deferred compensation plan and sought damages
and attorney's fees under ERISA.84 The Third Circuit distinguished con-
tractually-based pension claims from claims arising under statutory viola-
tions of ERISA.8 5 The Barrowdough court held that, while contractually-
based claims may be subject to arbitration, claims arising from statutory
violations are to be brought in federal court notwithstanding an agree-
ment to arbitrate.8 6 The court stated that the provisions of ERISA contain
a complex and evolving body of federal law designed to be enforced by the
federal courts.8 7 Arbitration would hinder a uniform interpretation of
ERISA claims because arbitrators are not bound to follow the law or prece-
dent and may base their decisions on the contractual provisions at stake,
rather than on federal statutory law.88 For these reasons, the Barrowdough
court held that pension claims arising out of ERISA could not be ad-
dressed outside a judicial forum.89 The Third Circuit's reluctance to en-
force arbitration for federal statutory claims, ERISA or otherwise,
remained the state of the law in the Third Circuit until 1993.90
Even after the Supreme Court's opinions in McMahon and Rodriguez,
the Third Circuit continued to disfavor arbitration for other federal statu-
83. Id. at 941.
84. Id. at 926-27.
85. Id. at 939-41. The Barrowdough court noted the distinctions between con-
tractually-based rights and statutory rights arising under a federal protective statute
such as ERISA when it stated: "While courts could defer to an arbitral decision
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guaran-
tees to individual workers". Id. at 940 (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981)).
86. Id. at 941.
87. Id. at 940-41; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). Section 29 provides, in
pertinent part:
(b) Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring dis-
closure and reporting, setting standards of conduct, etc., for fiduciaries
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect inter-
state commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with re-
spect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and ob-
ligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added).
88. Barrowdough, 752 F.2d at 941.
89. Id. Barrowclough's claims, which were independent of alleged violations
of substantive provisions of ERISA, were held arbitrable, but those claims that
arose under substantive provisions of ERISA were to be addressed in a judicial
forum. Id. at 939-41.
90. For a discussion of how the Pritzker decision changed the law, see infra
notes 100-42 and accompanying text.
19941
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tory claims. For example, in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc.,91 the
Third Circuit held that claims arising under the ADEA were not subject to
arbitration. 92 Nicholson, an attorney for CPC International, signed an ex-
ecutive employment contract which provided for arbitration of any contro-
versy arising under the contract.93 When Nicholson was told that his
position was being eliminated due to corporate restructuring, Nicholson
alleged age discrimination and filed claims under the ADEA.94 Pursuant
to the provisions of Nicholson's employment contract, CPC moved to com-
pel arbitration of the ADEA claim, a motion which the district court later
denied.95 On appeal, the Third Circuit examined the text and legislative
history of the ADEA, as well as the underlying purpose of the statute. 96
While the Third Circuit did not find the text and the legislative history
conclusive of whether arbitration should be allowed, it did find that the
enforcement provisions of the ADEA conflicted with mandated arbitra-
tion.97 It reached this conclusion despite the view expressed by the
Supreme Court in McMahon that the Federal Arbitration Act establishes a
"federal policy favoring arbitration."98 Thus, the Third Circuit is not in-
91. 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989).
92. Id. at 230-31.
93. Id. at 222-23. The contract provided, in pertinent part:
Any dispute or controversy arising under or in connection with this
Agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration, conducted before a
panel of three arbitrators in New York City in accordance with the rules
of the American Arbitration Association then in effect. Judgment may be
entered on the arbitrators' award in any court having jurisdiction. The
expense of such arbitration shall be borne by the Company.
Id. at 223.
94. Id.
95. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. Judge H. Lee Sarokin, in denying the motion
to compel arbitration, relied on his previous decision in Steck v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.NJ. 1987). Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223.
In Steck, Judge Sarokin held that the text and history of the ADEA evidenced Con-
gress' intent to preclude arbitration. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 547 (stating that court
"has examined the ADEA's legislative history, as well as that of the civil rights stat-
utes upon which it was closely modeled, and has discerned a Congressional intent
to preclude waiver of judicial remedies under the ADEA"). Judge Sarokin also
stated that the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon did not alter the Steck hold-
ing. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223.
96. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224-30.
97. Id. at 227. Specifically, the Nicholson court found as determinative the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) obligation to enforce the
ADEA. Id. Because an employee is required to file a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC before any court action can be taken, the Nicholson court stated that
there would be little incentive for employees to file charges if they could not subse-
quently litigate their cases in court. Id. Furthermore, Congress' intent behind the
filing rejuirement was to document alleged cases of discrimination so as to gather
information for future recommendations to Congress. Id. If arbitration were al-
lowed, few cases would be reported by an employee, thus frustrating congressional
intent. Id.
98. Id. at 223 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. Mc-
Mahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) ("The Arbitration Act thus establishes a 'Federal
16
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clined to automatically validate an arbitration agreement, but instead, will
look to the text, history, and purpose of the statute in question to deter-
mine whether arbitration should be permitted.99
In 1993, the Third Circuit re-examined ERISA issues in Pritzker v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.10 0 Despite its stance against arbitra-
tion, the Third Circuit in Pitzker held that statutory violations under
ERISA were subject to arbitration.' 0 1 In Pritzker, Pritzker and others,10 2 as
trustees of a pension and profit sharing plan,' 0 3 sued Merrill Lynch'
0 4
under ERISA for breaches of fiduciary duty.10 5 Merrill Lynch moved to
compel arbitration based on the Arbitration Act and the arbitration clause
contained in the Cash Management Agreements.' 0 6 The district court de-
policy favoring arbitration' ... .") (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
99. While the Nicholson opinion is instrumental in understanding the Third
Circuit's reluctance to enforce agreements to arbitrate, the Nicholson decision was
overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Gilmer which held that claims arising
under the ADEA are arbitrable. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 35 (1991). Therefore, Nicholson should only be read from a historical
perspective and not as a current interpretation of the state of the law in this area.
For a discussion of Gilmer, see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
100. 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
101. Id. at 1115-16.
102. Id. at 1112. Plaintiffs, the Trustees of the Penn Electric Supply Company
Profit Sharing Plan, consisted of Eli Pritzker, Sol Cooperstein and Jack Levin. Id.
103. Id. The pension plan was created for the benefit of the employees of the
Penn Electric Supply Company, Northeast Electric Supply Company, Coatesville
Electric Supply Company, M & G Electric Supply Company and Doylestown Elec-
tric Supply Company. Id. All of the aforementioned companies were co-plaintiffs
in the suit. Id.
104. Id. The defendants to the appeal included Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.; Belinda P. Stewart (the financial consultant and investment pur-
chaser to the Accounts) and Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. Id.
105. Id. at 1113. In Count One, the Trustees alleged that defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by purchasing investment fund units without ap-
proval. Id. In Count Two, the Trustees alleged that Merrill Lynch Asset Manage-
ment, Inc. was liable for defendants' violations because they "knowingly" credited
the transactions to the accounts. Id. In Count Three, the Trustees alleged that the
investment purchases violated § 406 of ERISA because Stewart, the financial con-
sultant, received a sales commission on the transaction. Id.; see also ERISA § 406,
29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988). Section 406 of ERISA states, in pertinent part:
(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not-
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own
account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction
involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose inter-
ests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its partici-
pants or beneficiaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from any
party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving
the assets of the plan.
Id. § 1106(b).
106. Pritzkwr, 7 F.3d at 1113.
1994]
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nied the motion to compel based on its decision in Barrowclough.10 7 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district court and
found that Barrowdough was inconsistent with recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence.10 8
The Third Circuit interpreted McMahon and Rodriguez to hold that
the concerns enunciated in Barrowdough disfavoring arbitration were no
longer applicable.' 0 9 First, the Third Circuit reasoned that arbitration of
ERISA claims would not stifle judicial development of the law because not
all pension fund agreements contain arbitration clauses.' 10 The Pritzker
court analogized this case to Gilmer, where the Supreme Court permitted
arbitration under the ADEA.II The Gilmer Court stated that judicial de-
velopment of the ADEA would not be hampered by arbitration because "it
is unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants will be subject to arbitra-
tion agreements."'112 Therefore, the Pritzker court found no reason to con-
clude that the judicial development of ERISA would be hindered by an
agreement to arbitrate.' 1 3
Second, the Pritzker court stated that an asset management agreement
between trustees and a brokerage firm is not an employment contract that
would be exempt from arbitration under § 1 of the Arbitration Act." 4
The Third Circuit, therefore, distinguished the "Cash Management Agree-
ments" in question from employment contracts:
The Cash Management Agreements did not implicate workplace
conditions, terms of employment or other topics ordinarily cov-
ered by employment contracts. Moreover, there was no manage-
ment-labor relationship between the defendants and the plan
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1112, 1118-21. This Casebrief focuses on the second issue decided
by Pritzker. Whether statutory ERISA claims are subject to arbitration. See id. at
1113 ("[W]e must.., decide whether their statutory ERISA claims are subject to
arbitration despite our holding in Barrowdough."). The Pritzker court addressed
two other issues: (1) whether the Trustees agreed to arbitrate the claims (i.e.
whether the arbitration clause was valid) and (2) whether the claim was subject to
arbitration even though neither Stewart nor Merrill Lynch Asset Management
signed the arbitration agreement. Id. For a discussion of the validity of the arbitra-
tion clause, see Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1114-15. For a discussion of the signatories to the
clause, see Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1121-22.
109. Id. at 1117-20.
110. Id. at 1119.
111. Id. at 1119-20; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 25, 35 (1991) (allowing arbitration for ADEA claim). For a discussion of Gil-
mer, see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
112. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
113. Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1119.
114. Id. at 1119-20; see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (pro-
viding, in pertinent part, that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of ... any ... class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce").
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beneficiaries; instead, their relationship . . .was a common one
between a brokerage firm and its clients.115
Because of these differences, § 1 of the Arbitration Act did not preclude
disputes arising out of the asset management agreements from
arbitration. 116
Third, the Pritzker court distinguished its facts from certain Supreme
Court cases that permitted litigation of employment discrimination
claims1 17 "despite the completion of arbitral proceedings." 1 8 The Third
Circuit noted that these cases differed from Pritzker in that they did not
arise under the Arbitration Act, but rather arose in a collective bargaining
context. 119
Finally, the Third Circuit dismissed the notion that arbitrators would
not follow ERISA law simply because the Arbitration Act does not require
arbitrators to set forth the basis of their ruling. 120 The court stated that
this concern was based on a distrust of arbitration, a position to which the
Supreme Court no longer adheres. 12 1
IV. IBJ7ZCFZ ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THOSE PRACTICING IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
To practitioners in the Third Circuit, the Pritzker opinion signals a
reversal by the Third Circuit from its prior holdings against arbitration. 122
Those practitioners favoring the enforcement of arbitration clauses can
make strong arguments that Pritzker should be broadly interpreted to en-
compass many, if not all, statutory claims arising under an agreement to
arbitrate. t 23 However, given the Third Circuit's general disfavor of arbi-
tration, those practitioners favoring a narrower interpretation of Pritzker
also may legitimately support their attempts to require ajudicial forum. 124
115. Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1120.
116. Id.
117. For a discussion of the cases in which the Supreme Court has permitted
litigation instead of arbitration, see supra note 58.
118. Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1120.
119. Id. at 1120-21.
120. Id. at 1121.
121. Id.
122. For a discussion of prior Third Circuit holdings against arbitration, see
supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
123. Even prior to the Pritzker decision, many scholars favored the recent judi-
cial trend toward arbitration of statutory ERISA claims. Stephen A. Mazurak, Alter-
native Dispute Resolution of Employment Claims: Exclusivity, Exhaustion, and Preclusion,
64 U. DET. L. Rv. 623, 660 (1987) (stating that courts should expand and experi-
ment with alternative dispute resolution); Simone, supra note 72, at 192 (support-
ing increase of courts' enforcement of arbitration agreements). See, e.g., Amy L.
Brice, Note, Statutoy Claims Under ERISA: Is Arbitration the Appropriate Forum ?, 1991
J. DIsp. RESOL. 171, 181 (1991) (noting that "ERISA claims will probably go the way
of most federal statutory rights today and be held completely arbitrable");
124. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's position on arbitration agree-
ments, see supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
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The Pritzker court noted that it overruled Barrowdough based on the
Supreme Court's trend and the "current strong federal policy" favoring
arbitration.12 5 Given the Third Circuit's prior reluctance to impose arbi-
tration, however, it is possible that the Third Circuit does not share the
Supreme Court's approval of arbitration for a wide array of statutory
claims. 126 While the Third Circuit is bound to follow Supreme Court pre-
cedent, the Third Circuit may distinguish a case which factually does not
fall within the confines of a previous Supreme Court decision. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has never addressed whether statutory violations
arising out of employment contracts are subject to arbitration. 12 7 If, for
instance, a claim arose which alleged an ERISA violation in a contract of
employment, the case would be one of first impression for the Third Cir-
cuit. Given the clear language of § 1 of the Arbitration Act prohibiting
arbitration of violations arising out of employment contracts, 12 8 the Third
Circuit could hold that a judicial forum is required.
Indeed, the Pritzker court contemplated such a fact pattern in a foot-
note of the opinion. 129 The footnote provides: "[in] contrast to this case,
certain types of statutory ERISA claims may arise in such a fashion or may
so implicate employees' rights that they come within the provision of the
Federal Arbitration Act which precludes arbitration of contracts of em-
ployment."13 0 Furthermore, in the text of the opinion, the Pritzker court
was careful to point out that the arbitration clauses in question were not
contained in employment contracts, but were contained in separate "asset
management agreements between the Trustees and the brokerage firm
which agreed to manage plan funds."13 1 Therefore, arbitration may not
125. Ptitzker, 7 F.3d at 1115-16. The court noted its reluctance in overruling
Barrowdough:
We commend the district court judge for faithfully adhering to this cir-
cuit's precedent in applying Barrowclough despite his understandable in-
clination to compel arbitration given the current strong federal policy
favoring this method of resolution. We are likewise mindful that the doc-
trine of stare decisis counsels reluctance when we are confronted with a
situation calling for the internment of a precedent; however, we have not
hesitated to act when we discover that our decisions have fallen out of
step with current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Id. at 1115. The court further mentions in footnote five of the opinion that Barrow-
dough is overruled only with regard to the arbitration of statutory claims: "Barrow-
dough remains the law of this circuit in other respects ...." Id. at 1115 n.5.
126. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's prior approach to arbitration, see
supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
127. See Gilmer v. Intersate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991)
(stating that it would "leave for another day" decision of whether claims arising
under employment contracts violate § 1 of Federal Arbitration Act).
128. For pertinent language of § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, see supra
note 114.
129. See Pritzke, 7 F.3d at 1112 n.1 ("[T]his opinion should not be read to
require arbitration of statutory ERISA claims in all instances .... We do not ad-
dress, for example, labor or any other bargaining process .. .
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1120.
(Vol. 39: p. 957
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be proper for an ERISA claim that arises out of a provision in an employ-
ment contract13 2 or "so implicate [s] employees' rights"I3 3 that arbitration
would be improper.
Another way to limit the Pritzker decision would be to argue that the
legislative history shows an intent not to arbitrate.' 3 4 In the legislative his-
tory of ERISA, the Senate version contained a section allowing for arbitra-
132. Although arbitration may be improper under the Federal Arbitration
Act, which excludes arbitration of employment contracts, at least one scholar notes
that state law may still have some role in enforcing arbitration agreements. See
PERRIrr, supra note 25, § 7.10 (Supp. 1993) (finding choice-of-law clause in arbitra-
tion agreement that applies state law is not preempted by Federal Arbitration Act
(citing Thompson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Cucchiella, 594 N.E.2d 870, 873
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992))).
133. Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1112 n.1.
134. See H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM.
ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGIsLATIrE HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT IN-
COME SEcURrrY ACT OF 1974, at 1883, 2096-98 (1976) (outlining arbitration provi-
sion). The Senate version of ERISA, as outlined below, provided for arbitration,
while the current version does not. Id. This fact lends credence to the idea that
Congress may have intended to preclude arbitration as a method of dispute resolu-
tion under ERISA. The arbitration section of the Senate version provides, in perti-
nent part:
SEC. 691 ARBITRATION; CIVIL ACTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS AND
BENEFICIARIES.
(a) Arbitration Procedure-Each employee pension benefit plan
subject to this part shall provide-
(1) a procedure for the fair and just review under the plan of
any dispute between the administrator of the plan and any par-
ticipant or beneficiary of the plan, and
(2) an opportunity, after such review and a decision by the ad-
ministrator (or a failure to make a decision within a reasonable
period of time by the administrator), for the arbitration of such
disputes.
(b) Civil Actions-A participant or beneficiary of such a plan may
bring a civil action in accordance with the provisions of section 693 of this
Act in lieu of submitting the dispute to arbitration under the plan.
(c) Alternative Procedures-If a dispute under a plan is subject to
procedures established by collective bargaining for the resolution of such
dispute, the Secretary of Labor, upon written request by a plan adminis-
trator, may waive the application of subsections (a), (b), and (e) to such
dispute if he determines that the procedures provided for are reasonably
fair and effective.
(d) Application of Law Relating to Section 301 of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947-
The arbitration of disputes in accordance with the requirements of this
section, and judicial proceedings relating thereto, shall be governed by
the laws, decisions, and rules applicable to the arbitration of disputes
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.
(e) Payment of Arbitration Costs-The cost of any arbitration pro-
ceedings required under this section (including arbitrators' fees) shall be
paid by the plan under which the dispute arises, unless the arbitrator
determines that a participant's or beneficiary's allegations are frivolous
and assesses all or a portion of such cost to that party.
(f) Information and Assistance-The Secretary shall inform partici-
pants and their beneficiaries under plans to which this part applies of
21
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tion between the plan administrator and any participant. 13 5 The current
version of ERISA contains no such arbitration section.1 36 At least one
commentator has recognized that the deletion of the arbitration section
may be "a message from Congress to the courts that ERISA confers rights
which may not be precluded from the judicial forum."' 3 7
However, most commentators do not give much weight to the pro-
posed arbitration section in the Senate version of ERISA and, therefore,
have found no textual or legislative history precluding arbitration.' 3 8
More importantly, the Pritzker court did not mention this portion of legis-
lative history, but instead, cited general statements of the legislative pur-
pose to hold that Congress did not intend to preclude arbitration.' 3 9
Indeed, while the proposed arbitration section is useful in determining
congressional intent, it is possible that the arbitration section was deleted
because Congress thought the broad scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
would cover ERISA claims. Therefore, while the legislative history is not
their rights under this part. The Secretary is authorized to furnish assist-
ance to such participants and their beneficiaries in obtaining such rights.
(g) The Secretary shall prescribe rules and regulations necessary to
carry out this action.
Id.
135. For the legislative history of ERISA, see supra note 134.
136. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988); see also Brice, supra note 123, at
175 (noting deletion of arbitration provision in current version of ERISA).
137. Brice, supra note 123, at 175.
138. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 37, at 558 ("ERISA's legislative history provides
even less support than the statute's text for an FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] ex-
ception."). Shell does not mention the proposed arbitration section, but instead
cites to a conference report that references § 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107 (stating that all ERISA actions "in Federal
or state courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in
similar fashion to those brought under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947"). Earlier cases referenced this conference report as evidencing con-
gressional intent to limit arbitrability in cases under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Shell, supra note 37, at 558-59; see also Bird v. Shearson Lehman/ Am. Express,
Inc., 871 F.2d 292, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1989) (examining similarities between legisla-
tive histories of ERISA and Labor-Management Relations Act and concluding that
violations of both acts are to be resolved within judicial forum); Barrowclough v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 936 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1985) (same),overruled by
Pritzker v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) .
However, Shell dismissed the inference that the conference report showed con-
gressional intent to limit arbitration. Shell, supra note 37, at 559. Shell states:
"[w]hatever light this language may shed on the arbitration of claims in the labor
context, a review of the entire passage demonstrates that it is far from a clear state-
ment on arbitration under the FAA." Id.
139. Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d
Cir. 1993). The legislative purpose of ERISA was to "help administrators, fiducia-
ries, and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions." Id. (citing Bar-
rowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 941 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting S.
REp. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4639,
4865) overruled by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d
1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
(Vol. 39: p. 957
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dispositive of the issue, it may provide a starting point in limiting the arbi-
tration of ERISA claims.
Although the Pritzker holding may be limited to certain defined cir-
cumstances, the Third Circuit will nonetheless be impacted by an increase
in the number of arbitration agreements contained within ERISA plans
and by an increase in the amount of claims taken to arbitration. While
some plaintiffs may fear that arbitration proceedings award lower damages
than would be awarded in ajudicial forum, this concern is unfounded for
two reasons. First, under ERISA, damages are contract-based, making the
amount awarded to a plaintiff consistent, regardless of whether damages
are awarded in an arbitration or judicial proceeding. 140 Moreover, puni-
tive damages and damages for emotional distress or mental suffering are
generally not recoverable under ERISA,14 1 thus further quashing any ad-
ded incentive to enter the judicial forum. Second, the text of ERISA is
silent on whether a jury trial is available under the statute, which has led
most courts of appeals to hold that no such right to a jury trial exists. 142
Therefore, because ERISA provides for neither punitive damages, nor a
jury trial, the incentives for a judicial forum are not particularly strong.
Combine these factors with the efficiency of an arbitral forum, which may
provide a remedy within a matter of months rather than years, and arbitra-
tion becomes a viable alternative for dispute resolution of statutory ERISA
claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The Pritzker decision, holding in favor of arbitration, signals a signifi-
cant departure from past Third Circuit jurisprudence. This shift is but-
tressed by strong Supreme Court precedent favoring arbitration of federal
statutory claims. While practitioners can still make a sound argument for
limiting arbitration in certain contexts under Pritzker, the advantages of
arbitration warrant a broad interpretation of the decision to afford ERISA
beneficiaries an inexpensive, efficient alternative for the resolution of
their claims.
Sarah E. Bouchard
140. See PEmxrr, supra note 25, § 3.37 (explaining contractual nature of dam-
ages under ERISA).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 7.11.
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